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FLUCTUATIONS IN PHYSICS AND BIOLOGY: STOCHASTIC RESONANCE, SIGNAL PROCESSING AND RELATED PHENOMENA MEETING REGISTRATION FORM To be returned to R Mannella FAMILY NAME : : : : : : : : : : FIRST NAME : : : : : : : : : : TITLE ....... NAME OF INSTITUTION : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
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TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE INFOSEC CERTIFICATION METHODOLOGY Charles N. Payne, Judith N. Froscher and Carl E. Landwehr Center for High Assurance Computing Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D.C. 20375 5337
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ORANGE LOCKING: CHANNEL-FREE DATABASE CONCURRENCY CONTROL VIA LOCKING John McDermotta and Sushil Jajodiab aCode 5540, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC 20375, USA bDepartment of Information Systems and Systems Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA Keyword Codes:
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Transaction Processing Using an Untrusted Scheduler in a Multilevel Database with Replicated Architecture* Oliver Costich Center for Secure Information Systems, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, Virginia 22030, USA Software Architecture and Engineering, 13100 Worldgate Drive,
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A Practical Transaction Model and Untrusted Transaction Manager for a Multilevel-Secure Database System Myong H. Kanga, Oliver Costichb , and Judith N. Froschera a Center for Secure Information Technology, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. 20375 b Center for Secure Information Systems, George
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The Cascade-Correlation Learning Architecture Scott E. Fahlman and Christian Lebiere August 29, 1991 CMU-CS-90-100 School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213
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The replicated architecture for multilevel secure database systems provides security by replicating data into separate untrusted single-level database systems. To be successful, a system using the replicated architecture must have a concurrency and replica control algorithm that does not introduce any
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Naval Research Laboratory, Code 5540, Washington, D.C. 20375-5337 Proof Requirements in the Orange Book: Origins, Implementation, and Implications Garrel Pottinger Mathematical Sciences Institute 409 College Avenue Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14850 February 11, 1994 A report prepared for the Naval
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A General Theory of Composition for Trace Sets Closed Under Selective Interleaving Functions John McLean Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375
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The Specification and Modeling of Computer Security John McLean Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D.C. 20375 Computer security models are specifications designed, among other things, to limit the damage caused by Trojan Horse programs such as computer
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Security Models John McLean 1 Introduction The term security model has been used to describe any formal statement of a system's confidentiality, availability, or integrity requirements. In this article we focus on the primary use of security models, which has been to describe general confidentiality
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Proving Noninterference and Functional Correctness Using Traces John McLean Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D. C. 20375 The trace method of software specification is extended to provide a natural semantics for a procedural programming language. This
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Security Models and Information Flow John McLean Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D.C. 20375 We develop a theory of information flow that differs from Nondeducibility's, which we see is really a theory of information sharing. We use our theory to develop a
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A Comment on the "Basic Security Theorem" of Bell and LaPadula* John McLean Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D.C. 20375 Many claim that the security model developed by Bell and LaPadula and used as a basis for numerous prototype military computer systems
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To Appear, IFIP World Congress 94 Link 3, Issue 5: How Much is Safety Worth Sess. L-29.2, 1 Sept 94 Hidden safety requirements in large-scale systems Carl E. Landwehr Naval Research Laboratory, Code 5542, Washington, DC 20375-5337, USA
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REPRINT DEPARTMENTOFTHENAVYNAVALRESEARCHLABORATORY A Classical Automata Approach to Noninterference Type Problems Ira S. Moskowitz and Oliver L. Costich FROM: Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop 5, Franconia, NH, June 1992, pages 2-8, IEEE Press. CONTACT: Ira S. Moskowitz,
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REPRINT DEPARTMENTOFTHENAVYNAVALRESEARCHLABORATORY Simple Timing Channels Ira S. Moskowitz and Allen R. Miller FROM: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 16-18 1994, pages 56-64, IEEE Press. CONTACT: Ira S. Moskowitz, Information
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A FORMAL METHOD FOR THE ABSTRACT SPECIFICATION OF SOFTWARE John McLean Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D.C. 20375 An intuitive presentation of the trace method for the abstract specification of software contains sample specifications, syntactic and
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Design Documentation for the SINTRA Global Scheduler Myong H. Kang Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Rodney Peyton Kaman Sciences Corporation Locus Directorate Suite 100 2560 Huntington Ave Alexandria, VA 22303
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A Multilevel Transaction Problem for Multilevel Secure Database Systems and its Solution for the Replicated Architecture Oliver Costich John McDermott Center for Secure Information Systems George Mason University 4400 University Drive Fairfax, Virginia 22030 Naval Research Laboratory Code 5542
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Data Dependence Analysis for an Untrusted Transaction Manager Myong H. Kang Naval Research Laboratory Code 5542 Washington, D.C. 20375
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AN EXPERIENCE MODELING CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS Charles N. Payne, Jr. Andrew P. Moore, and David M. Mihelcic Center for High Assurance Computing Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D.C. 20375-5337
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REPRINT DEPARTMENTOFTHENAVYNAVALRESEARCHLABORATORY A Pump for Rapid, Reliable, Secure Communication Myong H. Kang and Ira S. Moskowitz FROM: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer & Communications Security, Fairfax, VA, Nov 3-5 1993, pages 119-129, ACM Press. CONTACT: Myong H. Kang,
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Maintaining Multilevel Transaction Atomicity in MLS Database Systems with Kernelized Architecture Oliver Costich* Sushil Jajodia Center for Secure Information Systems, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, Virginia 22030, USA
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The b2/c3 problem: How big buffers overcome covert channel cynicism in trusted database systems J. McDermott Naval Research Laboratory, Code 5542, Washington, DC 23075, USA
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Appears in Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop VII, pages 60-65, IEEE 1 Computer Society, 1994. 60 Confidentiality in a Replicated Architecture Trusted Database System: A Formal Model1 Oliver Costich John McLean John McDermott Center for Secure Information Systems George Mason
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How Far Can You Trust A Computer 1 Carl E. Landwehr Center for High Assurance Computing Systems, Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D.C., U.S.A
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On Key Distribution Protocols for Repeated Authentication Paul Syverson Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, DC 20375 (syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil)
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A Logical Language for Specifying Cryptographic Protocol Requirements Paul Syverson and Catherine Meadows Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, DC 20375
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A Model of Computation for the NRL Protocol Analyzer Catherine Meadows Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, DC 20375
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Formal Requirements for Key Distribution Protocols Paul Syverson and Catherine Meadows Center for High Assurance Computing Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington, DC 20375 USA
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Adding Time to a Logic of Authentication Paul F. Syverson Code 5543 Naval Research Laboratory Washington, DC 20375 (syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil)
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Applying Formal Methods to the Analysis of a Key Management Protocol Catherine Meadows Code 5543 Center for Secure Information Technology Naval Research Laboratory Washington, DC 20375
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The NRL Protocol Analyzer: An Overview Catherine A. Meadows Center for High Assurance Computer Systems Naval Research Laboratory Washington DC, 20375
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THE HANDBOOK FOR THE COMPUTER SECURITY CERTIFICATION OF TRUSTED SYSTEMS Judith N. Froscher Charles N. Payne, Jr. Code 5542 Naval Research Laboratory Washington, D.C. October 12, 1992
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A Practical Approach to High Assurance Multilevel Secure Computing Service J.N. Froscher*, M. Kang*, J.McDermott*, O. Costich , and C. E. Landwehr* *Naval Research Laboratory, Code 5542 Washington, DC 20375-5337 Independent Consultant e-mail: {froscher | mkang | mcdermott | costich |
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Naval Research Laboratory Washington, DC 20375-5320 NRL/FR/5542--93-9591 A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws, with Examples Carl E. Landwehr Alan R. Bull John P. McDermott William S. Choi Center for Computer High Assurance Systems Information Technology Division November 19, 1993
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ACHIEVING DATABASE SECURITY THROUGH DATA REPLICATION: THE SINTRA PROTOTYPE Myong H. Kang, Judith N. Froscher, John McDermott, Oliver Costich, and Rodney Peyton Naval Research Laboratory Information Technology Division Washington, D.C. 20375
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Architectural Impact on Performance of a Multilevel Database System Myong H. Kang and Judith N. Froscher Ravi Mukkamala Naval Research Laboratory Old Dominion University Information Technology Division Department of Computer Science Washington, D.C. 20375 Norfolk, VA 23529
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1 A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws, with Examples1 CARL E. LANDWEHR, ALAN R. BULL, JOHN P. MCDERMOTT, AND WILLIAM S. CHOI Information Technology Division, Code 5542, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. 20375-5337 An organized record of actual flaws can be useful to computer system
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The Interpreted TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA Requirements NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade Maryland 20755-6000 12 January 1995 Report No. TBD C-Evaluation Report No. Library No. TBD Interpreted TCSEC Requirements This page intentionally left blank ii
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PAT Guidance Working Group Form and Content of Vendor Test Documentation NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade Maryland 20755-6000 May 1994 Report No. TBD Library No. TBD FOREWORD The National Computer Security Center is issuing the Form and Content of Vendor Design
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PAT Guidance Working Group Form and Content of Vendor Design Documentation NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade Maryland 20755-6000 May 1994 Report No. TBD Library No. TBD FOREWORD The National Computer Security Center is issuing the Form and Content of Vendor Design
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A Hybrid Learning Model for Sequential Decision Making Presenter: Ron SunUniversity of Alabama email: rsun@cs.ua.edu
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1ADV ANCE PROGRAMThird IEEE InternationalSymposium onRequirementsEngineeringJanuary 6-10, 1997Annapolis MarriottWaterfront HotelAnnapolis, MDU. S. A. Sponsored by IEEE SOCIETYO MPUTERYEARS OF SERVICE 1946-1996 RTHEINSTITUTEOFELECTRICAL&ELECTRONICSENGINEERS,INC.IEEEIEEE Computer Society TC on Software
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Draft Page 1 of 68 SCR* Toolset: The User Guide James Kirby, Jr. January 21, 1997 5:01 pm 1.0 Introduction This document is intended to serve as an introduction to the SCR* toolset, and as a reference for users of the toolset, and for those who want to evaluate the toolset and its underlying method and
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Copyright 1997 IEEE. Published in the Proceedings of INFOCOM 97, April 7-11, 1997 in Kobe, Japan. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution
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Submitted to IEEE INFOCOM 98 1 A Performance Comparison of the Temporally-Ordered Routing Algorithm and Ideal Link-State Routing Vincent D. Park a and M. Scott Corson b a Naval Research Laboratory b University of Maryland